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Certain Legal Questions and Issues Raised by the September 11th Attacks
by Professor Robert K. Goldman*
In trying to analyze the legal implications of the eventsof September 11th, international lawyers and govern-ment officials are finding themselves in somewhat
uncharted territory. Because the attacks on the Pentagon
and the World Trade Center complex were apparently car-
ried out by non-state actors who may have planned, orga-
nized and financed key aspects of their illicit activities in
other states, it is not easy to frame U.S. responses within
familiar categories recognized by international law. Nor-
mally, a state goes to war against another state or internal
enemies. Although the war that the U.S. has pledged to
wage against the perpetrators of these horrific acts and the
state(s) that harbor them does not fit neatly within exist-
ing paradigms, any ensuing hostilities will nonetheless be
largely based on or extrapolated from preexisting inter-
national law rules and principles.
In analyzing these events, it is important to distinguish
two separate, but interrelated branches of international law:
the law governing the resort to armed force, and the law
applicable to the conduct of hostilities. The former is
found in the United Nations Charter (Charter) and state
practice, and the latter in the law of armed conflict, also
known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
Historically, states recognized a right to resort to war
between or among themselves as a lawful means to settle
political disputes. Hostilities were frequently triggered by
formal declarations of war, armed attacks followed by
such a declaration, or other acts indicating an intention
to engage in warfare. With the adoption of the UN Char-
ter in the wake of World War II, the legal rules changed
in this regard. By virtue of Articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the UN
Charter, states renounced the use of force as a means of
settling disputes and effectively outlawed aggressive war.
However, Article 51 of the Charter recognizes that a state
that is the victim of an armed attack (presumably by
another state(s)) can lawfully resort to force in exercise of
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
against aggression.
The term “war” has a particular meaning in U.S. law,
which involves complex constitutional issues of separa-
tion of powers. Under the federal Constitution, only Con-
gress can declare war and it has not done so since World
War II. However, the U.S., without such a declaration,
but under the President’s express and implied powers, has
been involved in numerous armed conflicts, including
Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, Grenada, and Panama. Like his
father in the Gulf war, President Bush has received from
Congress, not a declaration of war as such, but a joint res-
olution authorizing him to use military force against
nations, organizations and persons involved in these attacks
and those states which harbor such organizations and
persons. Various actions on the international level also have
significantly strengthened the President’s hand to under-
take, consistent with international law, hostile acts against
these persons, groups and/or states. 
Certainly, if a state had launched these attacks, the
U.S., as the victim of aggression, could under Article 51 of
the Charter legitimately take military action against that
state and call on other states to assist it. Significantly, the
NATO Treaty—which declares an attack on one member
an attack on all members of the alliance—has been invoked
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for the first time, and may well result in unprecedented
joint military operations under that treaty. A claim by
NATO members to be acting in accordance with Article 51
and the Charter’s purposes would carry great weight and
contribute to the interpretation of Charter norms. Most
importantly, the United Nations Security Council, on Sep-
tember 12, 2001, unanimously approved Resolution 1368
(2001), stating that any act of international terrorism was
a threat to international peace and security. While calling
on all states to bring to justice “the perpetrators, organiz-
ers and sponsors” of these terrorist acts, it stressed that
“those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring
them would be held accountable,” and pointedly recog-
nized the right to individual and collective self-defense
under the Charter. This measure, while not expressly
authorizing the use of force, is sufficiently broad that it will
unquestionably be relied on by the U.S. if it decides to
employ force against any or all of these parties.
Can the U.S. be at “war” and engage in hostilities against
non-state actors? Historical precedents suggest that it can.
For example, the U.S. in 1805 sent an expeditionary force
to Tripoli to destroy the Barbary Pirates. In 1916, the U.S.
military was sent into Mexico to capture or kill Pancho Villa
and his band after they attacked U.S. nationals in New Mex-
ico. It is well settled that non-state actors who engage in
hostile acts during an armed conflict may be lawfully killed
or wounded. IHL permits governments engaged in civil
wars and lesser internal hostilities to attack members of dis-
sident armed groups, as well as the targeting of individual
1
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civilians who directly participate in internal or interstate
hostilities. All such persons are effectively non-state actors.
One might anticipate that the U.S., by analogy to interstate
armed conflict rules, will treat Osama bin Laden and his
associates as constituting a paramilitary organization whose
members do not comply with the most basic rules and cus-
toms of warfare. As such, the U.S. could treat them as
unprivileged combat-
ants subject to direct
attack and, if captured,
not entitled to prisoner
of war status. Accord-
ingly, they would be
liable for trial in a U.S.
court and punishment
for all their hostile acts,
as well as pre-capture
offenses. These offenses
entail multiple crimes
under U.S. and inter-
national law associated




bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998, for
which bin Laden has
already been indicted.
Had a state launched these attacks, that state would
clearly be responsible for having initiated an aggressive war
in violation of the UN Charter. It is unclear whether non-
state actors can be charged with and tried for this partic-
ular offense. However, if their attacks are treated as acts
of war, those acts would constitute serious violations of the
laws and customs of war. In this regard, IHL categorically
prohibits launching intentional attacks against the civilian
population, individual civilians, as well as civilian objects.
Moreover in 1977, states by treaty (Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and Relating
to Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts—Protocols I & II) prohibited in all armed conflicts
acts or threats of violence whose primary purpose is to ter-
rorize the civilian population. The World Trade Center
complex was a civilian object dedicated to ordinary civil-
ian purposes and inhabited by peaceable civilians. Thus,
these buildings were immune from direct attack. Their
deliberate destruction with the clear intent to kill or
wound civilians within those structures constituted an ille-
gal indiscriminate attack. Another clear and illicit purpose
of the attacks was to terrorize and attack the morale of the
civilian population. So great was the intended and actual
number of civilian deaths attending these attacks that
they also might well qualify as a crime against humanity.
The attack against the Pentagon arguably was also illegal.
Although the Pentagon does qualify under IHL as a mil-
itary objective, and is thus a lawful target of attack during
an armed conflict, it was attacked by perfidious or treach-
erous means—a hijacked civilian jetliner. 
Other international crimes, punishable under U.S. law
and the laws of other nations, were committed by the per-
petrators of these attacks and their confederates. The
seizure and destruction of the jetliners violated the 1970
Hague anti-hijacking convention, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 32,
which imposes criminal liability for, inter alia, willfully
destroying an aircraft and assaulting its passengers and
crew. Further, the effect on the passengers of these hijacked
planes might well amount to hostage taking in violation of
the Convention against the Taking of Hostages and
18 U.S.C. § 1203, which contains a similar proscription. Most
of these crimes are
already within the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction





tions of the laws and
customs of war are
international crimes
of universal jurisdic-
tion, making the per-
petrators subject to
criminal prosecution
by other states. At pre-
sent, there is no inter-
national court with
jurisdiction to try the
perpetrators and their
accomplices. How-
ever, the UN Security
Council, or perhaps a group of states which are parties to
these treaties, such as NATO members, could establish an
ad hoc tribunal for this purpose, based on the Yugoslav and
Rwanda models.
President Bush has stated that the U.S. will make no dis-
tinction between the perpetrators and those, presumably
states, who harbor them. Can the U.S. invoke Article 51 of
the UN Charter to justify taking military action against a
state that did not perpetrate the attacks of September 11,
but merely harbors the intellectual authors of and other
accomplices in these events? It is legally plausible that
the U.S. and its allies might impute these acts of terrorism,
constituting an armed attack, to such a state(s), thereby
holding it responsible for these crimes. International law
recognizes that the acts of non-state actors may be attrib-
uted under certain circumstances to a state. The U.S. may
argue that Afghanistan, for example, is guilty of both
omission and commission in connection with these and
previously realized or foiled attacks by Osama bin Laden
and his associates. That argument might posit that the Tal-
iban’s failure to take action against bin Laden effectively
amounts to a pattern of state tolerance of and acquiescence
in these illicit acts sufficient to impute and thus attribute
the conduct to the state itself. International human rights
bodies have used such reasoning in finding states respon-
sible for the conduct of non-state actors. For example, in
2000, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(Commission) in the Massacre of Rio Frio case found Colom-
bia responsible for atrocities committed by the Autode-
fensas Unidas de Colombia, a paramilitary group. The Com-
mission found that, even though the state had declared
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such groups to be illegal, it tolerated their presence and
had acquiesced in their depredations and killings in the
particular circumstances of that case.
If the United States takes military action against
Afghanistan or any other state, it will be involved in an
international armed conflict with that state within the
meaning of Article 2 common to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions. As such, the U.S., its allies, if any, and the target
state will be legally bound to conduct hostilities in accor-
dance with IHL, most particularly, the Geneva Conventions
and the laws and customs of warfare contained in the
Hague Regulations. Unlike UN law, modern IHL is not
concerned with the legality of the resort to force. Rather,
its fundamental rules are designed to regulate and restrain
the conduct of hostilities in order to spare the victims of
armed conflicts. Foremost among these rules are those
designed to ensure the immunity of the civilian population
and civilian objects, such as houses and schools, etc., from
direct attack by requiring the belligerents to distinguish
at all times such protected persons and objects from mil-
itary objectives and to direct their attacks solely against the
latter. The warring parties, moreover, cannot attack mil-
itary targets with impunity. When so doing, they must
take the necessary precautions to avoid or at least minimize
expected civilian casualties, i.e., collateral damage. In
other words, the U.S. cannot fight terror with terror.
Apart from being unlawful, attacks against civilians and
their morale are totally counterproductive, as the reaction
of the American people demonstrates, and wasteful of
military assets.
Can the U.S., without violating U.S. and international
law directly, target bin Laden in connection with such an
attack? The answer is yes. Executive Order 12333 (Order)
effectively renounces the use of assassination as an instru-
ment of U.S. policy. While so doing, the Order does not
define the term “assassination,” but it should be understood
as meaning an act of murder undertaken for political
purposes. The ostensible purpose of the Order at the
time of its adoption was to preclude the U.S. from killing,
for example, a foreign leader of a state with whom the U.S.
was not at war. The Order not only prohibits this, but also
the willful killing of a private person for political pur-
poses. This prohibition is consistent with international
human rights law, which prohibits a state from engaging
in arbitrary deprivations of life. 
The legal situation is different during situations of
armed conflict. Combatants may lawfully target and kill
enemy combatants, as well as civilians who directly par-
ticipate in the hostilities. As these persons are legitimate
targets of attack, their deaths are treated as justifiable
homicide for which the attacker incurs no liability under
domestic or international law. Such killings do not con-
stitute assassinations within the meaning of the Executive
Order or IHL, nor would they violate, in principle, the pro-
hibition against arbitrary deprivation of life in human
rights law.
As previously noted, the U.S. is justified in treating bin
Laden and the members of his organization as a para-
military force which engages in the illegal use of force.
Whether they be regarded as paramilitary or merely civil-
ians who have assumed a combatant’s role, they are in the
context of interstate hostilities unprivileged combatants
who are subject, individually and collectively, to direct
attack. So long as they are not attacked in a “treacherous”
manner, which does not include by commando raid, their
deaths would be lawful acts of war. 
* Robert K. Goldman is a Professor of Law and Co-Director of
the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at the
Washington College of Law. This essay was initially prepared for
the Crimes of War Project, and is available on their website at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/attack-gold.html.
4
Certain Legal Questions, continued from previous page
When so doing, they must take the
necessary precautions to avoid or at least
minimize expected civilian casualties . . .
the U.S. cannot fight terror with terror. 
The Human Rights Brief is profoundly saddened by the incomprehensible
events of September 11, 2001.
We respectfully offer our thoughts, prayers, 
and heartfelt sympathy to all of those who have been affected 
by this unspeakable tragedy.
Moreover, we extend our deep gratitude to the firefighters, 
police officers, and emergency workers 
who serve this nation.
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